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Abstract. The question of cognitive endowment in animals has been fiercely 
debated in the scientific community during the last couple of decades (for 
example, in cognitive ethology and behaviourism), and indeed, all throughout the 
long history of natural philosophy (from Plato and Aristotle, via Descartes, to 
Darwin). The scientific quest for an empirical, evolutionary account of the 
development and emergence of cognition has met with many philosophical 
objections, blind alleys and epistemological quandaries. I will argue that we are 
dealing with conflicting philosophical world views as well as conflicting empirical 
paradigms of research. After looking at some examples from the relevant literature 
of animal studies to elucidate the nature of the conflicts that arise, I propose, in 
strict Darwinian orthodoxy, that cognitive endowments in nature are subject to 
the sort of continuum and gradation that natural selection of fit variant forms 
tends to generate. Somewhere between the myth of “free” humans and the myth of 
“behaviourally conditioned” animals lies the reality of animal behaviour and 
cognition. In the end, I hope to have softened up some of those deep-seated 
philosophical problems (and many quasi-problems) that puzzle and dazzle 
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1. Introduction:  
Mental states in biology and cognitivism 
 
Marc Bekoff, as a proponent of cognitive ethology — which he defines 
as “the evolutionary and comparative study of nonhuman animal 
(hereafter animal) thought processes, consciousness, beliefs, or ratio-
nality” (Bekoff 19951) — has to take a defensive stand and justify (even 
excuse) his “cognitive” approach to animal studies; and indeed, the 
bulk of the essay quoted above is dedicated to answering the critics of 
the cognitive approach. It is surely a sign of the fragility of the field 
when Bekoff is emboldened (in the same essay quoted above) to use 
the term “slayers” to designate the fierce attitude of the harshest critics 
of cognitive ethology. 
Some people really are out to attack the whole field (of what I call 
zoo-cognitivism), on philosophical as well as scientific grounds. There 
are numerous variations of this anti-zoo-cognitivist critique, out of 
which we shall explore not a few. One major, recurring argument 
states that “[m]ental events are private phenomena” (G. C. Williams, 
quoted in Bekoff 1995) and consequently unreachable by science. This 
idea underlies not only Williams’s argument against the special claims 
of zoo-cognitivism, but also the more generalizable public opinion 
concerning man’s place in nature. We can go back to Plato, Descartes 
and Kant, and to any number of thinkers throughout the ages to find 
corroboration to this belief. My point of departure is strictly that of a 
scientist, and specifically of a Darwinist. We must not attack cognitive 
ethology from the point of view of orthodox Darwinism, as somehow 
“deviant”, when Darwin himself, in a famous passage in The Descent 
of Man, said that “the difference in mind between man and the higher 
animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind” 
(Darwin 1871: 105). More up-to-date support for mentalist theories of 
animals can be found in Uexküll’s concepts of “Umwelt” and 
                                                 
1  Unpaged online edition is used; hence no page numbers are shown. 
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“Innenwelt”, which are indispensable tools for zoosemiotics as it has 
developed since the early days of last century. Nonetheless, we shall 
focus more on dysfunctional theories of ancient origin such that 
predate semiotics, and that is why we will not explore Uexküllian se-
miotics further in this essay. Instead, we will focus on some epistemo-
logical quandaries around which debate gets framed, “stuck”. That is 
why actual semiotics does not get a special place in our analysis. Mind, 
I think, has to be understood first — or rather, revealed as a poorly 
understood and defined concept. We think we know what we mean by 
it, but do we? This and a few other Cartesian fallacies shall be ex-
punged in the course of this essay. 
In the conclusion to his essay, Bekoff (1995) gives a few reasons for 
taking the potential of the field of cognitive ethology seriously. The 
following is, for me, the most convincing:  
 
It may be more economical or parsimonious to assume that not 
everything that an individual needs to be able to do in all situations in 
which he finds himself is preprogrammed. While general rules of thumb 
may be laid down genetically during evolution, specific rules of conduct 
that account for all possible contingencies are too numerous to be hard-
wired (Griffin 1984). Behavioristic learning schemes can account for 
some flexibility in organisms, but learning at high degrees of abstraction 
from sensory stimulation seems less amenable to behavioristic analysis 
(Allen and Hauser 1991). 
 
I am basically in agreement with Bekoff’s claims above. However, we 
shall see that there are a number of serious philosophical (most 
notably epistemological) problems and blind alleys that need to be 
avoided or, better yet, cleared and superceded. In search of a cognitive 
evolutionary basis for animal communication as the precursor to our 
own, we encounter a few serious challenges which I hope to expose as 
serious, persistent and — ultimately — non-scientific and thus irre-
solvable. John Dupré has also pointed out, arguing against certain 
“Cartesian assumptions” (Dupré 1990: 429), that when we ask 
“whether animals other than ourselves have minds […] the problem is 
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paradigmatically philosophical” (Dupré 1990: 428), and not an empi-
rical question. Indeed, no amount of “evidence” can settle our diffe-
rent world views or unhinge our philosophical comfort zones. 
By analyzing the conflict of world views at play in the field of 
animal behaviour studies, we come to a better understanding of the 
sort of conundrums that keep science from being the sort of 
“objective” field of pure research that it often, and justifiably so, strives 
to be. Rather than seeing this as undermining knowledge, we can see 
this as constituting the possibility of continuous revolutionary 
overhaul of the working assumptions of scientific research. The pre-
sence of (resolvable) conflict and (intellectually stimulating) feverish 
debate is the sine qua non for a healthy society of peers. At any given 
moment, to use Kuhn’s terminology, a shift in paradigms may enliven 
the moribund body and reshuffle the deck. This, I argue, is what we 
face in the meeting-point between cognitive ethology and latter-day 
behaviourism today, in the form of various philosophical objections 
and assumptions that have come up as the debate has raged and stalled. 
We are at a crossroads, where the direction and orientation of future 
projects hangs on a balance. These are the times when our “faith” (in 
our world view) is put into test. 
At this point let there be no doubt that I propose a radicalization of 
empiricism against non-cognitive behaviourism, in as much as this old 
Forschungsmethode has, thus far, entailed a rejection of any and every 
biological Innenwelten and denied the presence of “internal freedom” 
in the brain-mind-world semiotic loop of animals. Although this does 
put into question the strictly narrow definition of anti-cognitive 
materialism as an ideology suitable for explaining animal behaviour, it 
does not mean rejecting physicalism in biology. The continuity 
hypothesis of evolutionary history (as postulated by Darwin) can be 
maintained without taking any one, single unifying scheme (like the 
trigger-response mechanism of behaviourism) as the preferred, 
plenipotentiary explanatory model. My new approach of “behavioural 
cognitivism” (or “cognitive behaviouralism”) aims to supercede 
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dualistic research programmes in consciousness studies and to reject 
(avoidable) anthropocentric biases in the study of the biosphere. 
Evolution, I believe, is hardwired to produce “freedom” (that is, 
internal responsiveness) in the process of fostering adaptability, 
variation and change — even if humans are the only ones who have 
come up with the term “freedom” to define their experience of the 
world and even if humans are unusually (because of our brain powers) 
self-conscious of having liberal cognitive capacities. We need to 
remember that most human societies throughout history have not 
even had a concept for what we call “freedom”; some three or four 
thousand years ago, or even as late as the European middle ages, 
people didn’t believe they were “free” in the modern sense. The myth 
of progress has given us the myth of freedom as its corollary. Freedom, 
in the current sense, is a secular interpretation of our Abrahamic-
Hellenic intellectual tradition. Descartes, after all, produced his 
“cogito” as a result of doubting, and then affirming, his Christian faith. 
At any rate, the scientific and psychological understanding of man as a 
creative, information processing psyche has served to separate us from 
the natural order and given us de jure superiority of the sort that, de 
facto, we have claimed all along.  
I believe that the last — or, anyway, the latest — “Copernican” 
cognitive revolution will entail questioning the rigid assumption that 
we are self-evidently conscious (in a way that, say, primates or rabbits 
are not) and correct in assuming that we are transparent to ourselves. 
We also must question its corollary, namely the belief that animals and 
such “other minds” are non-transparent to us, non-available to our 
gaze (beyond our science and senses). In a word, we must question the 
introspective perspective of the “I” (as a source of immediate and 
unique knowledge) as it functions in the knowledge construction and 
scientific studies of animal behaviour. We will have to either liberate 
consciousness and freedom as attributes of nature as such and to see 
them in that light, or else to deny the validity of such concepts 
altogether, and to reduce mankind further down to materiality. The 
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latter alternative, unless it coincides with the first, is probably a 
wrong-headed move (since behaviourism already tried it), so I believe 
the choice now is between increased bio-equality, on the one hand, 
and the persistence of an old myth of human uniqueness, on the other 
hand. The myth we are operating under is the idea that mankind has a 
“special something” (the perspective of perfect self-understanding as 
minds) that gives it — “us” — a private, exclusive “window” (to use 
Jane Goodall’s metaphor in the book Through a Window; Goodall 
1990: passim) into our own soul. This illusion is the equation of soul, 
or mind, with language (as a gift of transparency). This perspective, for 
convenience’s sake, we might call Cartesian rationalism. The relevant 
philosophical critiques of this perspective, from a general point of view, 
can be found in the works of John Searle, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Charles S. Peirce, Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida, among 
others. We don’t need to go into that direction here. Instead, we shall 
focus on the more particular and local problem of “other minds” in 
biology, ethology and primatology.  
We need to answer why, for people like Marc Bekoff and Jane 
Goodall, it continues to be difficult to convince other people about 
their strongly held convictions that animals, indeed, have minds. 
Goodall, for example, writes that in graduate school, “although I 
continued to hold to most of my convictions — that animals had 
personalities; that they could feel happy or sad or fearful; that they 
could feel pain; that they could strive towards planned goals and 
achieve greater success if they were highly motivated — I soon realized 
that these personal convictions were, indeed, difficult to prove” (Goodall 
1990: 16; my italics). In the absence of proof, Bekoff called his book 
Minding Animals, and Goodall hers, reflecting her point of view as an 
observer, Through a Window. They are both attempts to look, through 
the human window, into the mind of the animal. Instead of entering 
their discourse, which is oftentimes poetic and always suggestive but 
sometimes very subjective (for example: “As I stood quietly in the pale 
sunshine [...] I saw for a brief moment through another window and 
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In the process, we need to de-philosophize and de-mystify several 
key concepts involved here: freedom, consciousness, mind, behaviour, 
species, etc...  
The analysis, then, becomes a study of rhetoric (and the use of 
language) as well as of behavioural evidence (and the use of this 
evidence as data). 
Next, let us undertake a short discussion on “anthropomorphism” 
(chapter 2), after which we shall look at some epistemological dead 
ends that ethological practice inevitably runs into (chapter 3). Then, 
with the aim of clarifying our speech and problematizing the selfish-
ness associated with it, we explore the role of language in our 
definition of humanness (chapter 4). Finally, I hope to present (in 
chapters 5 and 6) an ethological outlook — a monistic world view — 
based on the unity of behaviourism and cognitivism in zoology, 
focusing on the possibility of a radically non-dualistic evolutionary 
approach to cognitive-behavioural studies. By the end (chapter 7), I 
hope to have gained deeper insight into some old philosophical 
problems of our long, proud, human tradition, in light of the 
with another vision” [Goodall 1990: 9]), I will look at ways in which 
science and epistemology have failed us in this quest, and why we are 
dealing with a conflict of world views irresolvable — it seems, at least 
to Goodall and Bekoff — by reason and science. After all, Goodall 
emphasizes the value of “peace ‘which passeth all understanding’” 
(Goodall 1990: 10). We need to understand why she takes for granted 
that “we cannot know with the mind of a chimpanzee” (Goodall 1990: 
11), at least not through the “window” of science and reason. She is 
constantly in search of “other windows; windows that have been 
unshuttered by the logic of philosophers; windows through which the 
mystics seek their visions of the truth” (Goodall 1990: 10). So, I am 
looking for the reasons as to why the debate hangs on the balance 
between two different windows and two different interpretations of 
the world. Why is the empirical data, in itself, not sufficient to prove 
that animals have minds? 
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conflicting world views and epistemological quandaries explored thus 
far.  
Do we wish to move beyond the dualism of behaviour vs. cog-
nition? How can we? Can we understand freedom as something that is 
hardwired in our genes? Physicalist evolutionary theory emphasizing 
the continuum hypothesis of nature, enriched with some semiotic 
insights, in my mind, is crucial in solving this riddle of the sphinx. 
 
 
2. Preliminary reflections on the topic  
of anthropomorphism 
 
There was a slight movement from Fifi’s nest and I saw that she had 
turned and was looking down at me. What was she thinking? How 
much of the past did she remember?  (Jane Goodall 1990: 7) 
 
It has been said that we are unavoidably anthropo-centric, and perhaps 
equally unavoidably anthropo-morphic, in our dealings with animals. 
Anthropomorphism, or “ascrib[ing] human emotions to non-human 
animals” (Goodall 1990: 16), has been called the “cardinal sin of 
ethology” (Goodall 1990: 16) and, facetiously, “the A-Word” (Griffin 
1990: xiii). The “A-word” is “often used as an all-purpose expression 
of disapproval”; it is, anthropologically speaking, “the name of a 
taboo” (Griffin 1990: 4). John Andrew Fisher, in his analysis of the 
phenomenon, The Myth of Anthropomorphism, blames this kind of 
thinking on the “Cartesian heritage […] that attributed to humans 
(that is, mental substance) all real mentality and to animals (that is, 
machines) none” (Fisher 1990: 99). This “Cartesian dogma” (Fisher 
1990: 99) is commonly rejected by Darwinists but tacitly assumed by 
many cognitive scientists and traditional philosophers. Noam 
Chomsky, Thomas Sebeok and Steven Pinker are some of the repeated 
offenders here. I believe that this is an unfruitful road of inquiry, and a 
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real burden that we needlessly carry from the past. This tradition has 
upheld a double illusion, or a double dogma:  
1) We think of ourselves as Beings into whose mystery we have 
“internal” access, by way of introspection. By extension, unless we are 
complete solipsists, we think that we have similar access — at least 
limited knowledge, theoretically — to the minds of our conspecifics by 
extrapolating outwards by way of analogy or empathy or imagination. 
This way of reasoning — by which we claim to know our minds and, 
by extension, our “shared humanity” — can be called the argument 
from the primacy of experience (that only humans can share). It 
claims access to a transparent domain of (phenomenological) know-
ledge. “I know what I’m feeling! I know what I’m thinking! I know 
what my intentions are!” This is the starting point of what John 
Andrew Fisher (1990: 113) has called the perspective of the “isolated 
Cartesian ego”. 
2) The second illusion, or dogma, is really just the flip-side of the 
first point — its negative implication, as it were: it claims that we can 
not know the contents of minds about which we have no “personal 
knowledge”, that is onto which we have no vista or access. As it 
happens, most people think that, in a way, we do have, or can have, 
immediate knowledge about other people’s minds (according to the 
non-solipsistic interpretation of the first dogma). But for some reason, 
claiming to have, or claiming to be able to acquire, immediate know-
ledge or hypothetical knowledge about the minds of animals is seen as 
a dangerous overstepping of boundaries. But I think this is nonsense. 
There are no good biological or psychological reasons for thinking 
that this categorical prohibition is any truer than strict solipsism is. 
They are both varieties of extreme rationalism in the line of Cartesian 
doubt, just like any radical skepticism is.  
For example: how do we know that you and I have the same 
experience of the colour “green”? The answer is not, ‘because I can 
extrapolate from my experience to yours’. Instead, the answer is: 
because ‘it doesn’t matter if we have different experiences or not’, we 
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can still function in society and do science “as if” we were both 
(equally) conscious, on the behavioural level, with the full knowledge 
that this “cannot be proven” to satisfy the skeptic. Most science 
operates on this “as if” basis, testing hypotheses to see whether our 
ways of life and world views cohere and enrich our lives in the long 
term. The way we treat other human beings operates on the principle 
of shared “liberal” assumptions about each others’ status and mental 
abilities. This kind of intuited “knowing” allows for a co-habitation in 
a shared reality (without ever offering any philosophically interesting 
“proofs” against hyper-rationalist skeptics). People just live in a shared 
behavioural space. 
Behaviour, here, is the definite clue to consciousness. In fact, 
behaviour, in most cases, means (stands for) empirical evidence: the 
data that is available to us, as a given. In fact, these two domains 
(behaviour and empirical data) are co-extensive in average ethological 
study. They simply mean the same thing. Cognitive ethology, too, in 
this regard at least, must be a sub-category of behaviourism, a sub-
category of empirical data. This conclusion follows if we want to 
accept the common sense hypothesis which says that all evidence must 
be collected using our perceptive instruments (including our scientific 
measuring tools) and cannot bypass reason. This means that beha-
viour, in most cases, stands as the sufficient proof that other people 
have minds. Babies generally recognize this very early on. Also, if I 
don’t believe it as an adult, I am liable to be an outcast to the society! 
Thus, there is a pragmatic, if philosophically “lazy” solution to our 
epistemological doubts: we operate in our everyday reality as if other 
minds exist out there, and as long as we do, there is no problem. Why 
should mind not emit signs of its presence? Mentality, I think, is 
something that is proven to be factual through interpretation of 
behaviour. We believe in minds that we see and encounter; not 
because I make any wild leaps of faith or assumptions about the 
“qualities” of their internal states, but because I read other people’s 
behaviour and, likewise, let my own behaviour be affected by human 
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gaze. As long as we operate “satisfactorily”, we are living in a “world of 
minds”. In such a world, we can operate with other people. By 
extension (which is perfectly reasonable and intuitive), in the absence 
of contradictory data we can also see ourselves as operating with other 
animals, in their cognitive presence. 
The way Jane Goodall (1990), for example, uses language to 
persuade the reader is remarkable. Her text is riddled with easily 
identifiable rhetorical tropes. She uses the word “clearly” a lot (the 
italics in the following are entirely mine); in one scene, an “infant [...] 
is clearly having a tantrum” (16); in another, an “adult male [...] is 
clearly in a good mood” (17); in yet another, a chimp is “clearly feeling 
cross and grumpy” (17). She sees these things clearly. As an argument, 
this is likely to fail to persuade some people, and it’s certainly not 
going to prove anything, but it shows that it is possible to infer 
cognition from behaviour to the degree of professed clarity. 
I would argue that to give credence to radical cognitive skepticism 
is to leave the door open for solipsism of the most pernicious kind, 
one that operates unethically under the banner of objectivity and 
neutrality. In fact, neutrality (in matters of consciousness) might well 
be the sort of mechanistic intervention that destroys life wherever it 
finds it, like the blind doctor who sees not that the patient is dying in 
his arms. Most people, from most cultures, see the point of view of so-
called “anthropomorphic” zoo-cognitive attribution as the natural 
starting point for understanding animal behaviour. They feel, rightly 
or wrongly, that this perspective is justified by their life-world. It also 
comes naturally to most children as soon as they develop moral 
sentiments. This is because they observe animal behaviour and see 
emotions, intentions and cognitive states. They don’t “extrapolate” or 
“imagine” these, but they see them. They live in a world of shared 
minds, of biotic mutuality of communication. They see themselves as 
minds-among-minds, and operate accordingly. There is no middle 
man here, no invisible medium, or film, of interpretation. Sometimes, 
of course, they are wrong (about their interpretation of perceived 
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events), but likewise they are sometimes wrong about other humans’ 
current mental states at any given time, accidentally, without being 
categorically wrong about humans’ cognitive capacities on the whole. 
This is because seeing does not imply seeing accurately. All “seeing” 
(or semiotic interpretation) implies making flash judgements based on 
immediate sensory knowledge with some margin of error. Without 
such active interpretation (which is always information-poor but 
experientially rich), all social co-existence is null and void (and anta-
gonistic). After all, if we had to think real hard whether people in a 
given situation had minds or not, we would fall by the wayside, away 
from the sort of respectable and clear position that social mutuality 
demands. Even upon stronger reflection, this sort of intuition does not 
seem to be overturned as much as wished away to suit the ideological 
purposes of a given era and philosophical current. Skepticism (and 
this was also Peirce’s opinion) works best on paper. 
Now, I cannot claim that skeptical arguments, as such, can be won 
over by counter-arguments of the sort I have proscribed. In fact, this is 
precisely my point: radical skepticism cannot be countered in words, 
only in experience, in data, in seeing the behaviour as “cognitive”. In 
this new framework, the mind is seen as co-extensive of behavioural 
evidence. Behaviour shows that animals have minds. Cognitive capa-
city can be measured scientifically and described ethologically. 
Our thinking relies on a long and rich religious, philosophical and 
psychological tradition. In this tradition, species-centrism has been 
allowed to flourish to the point where radical skepticism has put our 
naturalness into question. Disembodied rationalism and the alienation 
of man from nature have walked hand-in-hand from morning to 
sunset. Today, we need to go straight to the experience (as Husserl used 
to say, although still from a Cartesian perspective), back into the 
undivided unity of the “cognitive-behavioural observational event” of 
the natural habitat. Only by observing animals can we see their 
behaviour as cognitively endowed, as internally motivated.  
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So, I propose a radical “cognitive behaviourism” which is indebted 
in spirit to the analytical tradition of Willard van Orman Quine, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson. This 
kind of interventions seems to me the best remedy against radical 
rational skepticism of the sort that Descartes, Sebeok and Chomsky 
have variously proclaimed. The emphasis on pragmatic conceptions of 
the role of evidence in knowledge stretches back to the early British 
Empiricists, most notably John Locke, David Hume and George 
Berkeley, but the American Pragmatists provided it with a more “life-
world” oriented focus, starting from Peircean ontology, reaching into 
William James’s psychology and, more recently, the radical anti-
epistemology of Richard Rorty (1980). Without going into details of 
any of these theories, we shall simply lay down the focus in as simple 
terms as “humanly” possible.  
These are my hypotheses: 
1)  The mind does not exist, as such, apart from behavioural data. 
2)  We can know other minds simply based on their behaviour2 (and 
only in this way). 
3)  Behaviourally, too, we come to “know” (or posit) the minds of 
other human beings.  
4)  In fact, this is perhaps how we know our own mind: by socializing 
our behaviour. 
5)  The mind does not exist except as an observational hypothesis on 
behaviour. 
6)  There is no qualitative (observational) difference between language 
and behaviour.  
7)  There is no qualitative (observational) difference between mind 
and semiosis. 
8)  Consequently, pragmatically speaking, semiosis = language = 
behaviour = mind. 
                                                 
2  Behaviour is here defined rather loosely, heuristically, as the sum total of 
observable evidence. 
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9)  This unity is functional, evolutionary unity, in a monistic world. 
 
It should be noted that none of these concepts — or their conceptual 
unity — is meant to be taken essentialistically, or to imply any kind of 
metaphysical substance. Any organism’s “mind-behaviour” (its onto-
geny) is subject to the infinite continuum and variety of nature’s 
phylogeny. In other words, behavioural and mental emergence of 
forms is infinitely complex. Evolution can be messy business. What we 
can look for is continuity and connections. 
Building towards a radically Darwinian view of the world, we have 
established a working unity between many of the concepts that have so 
far been studiously kept apart. Rather than proving this unity, I simply 
take it for granted, and build on that working assumption. By not 
proving it, I am subjecting it to the test of experience and time, ready 
to be disproven or proven. In other words, I’m postulating a hypo-
thesis. We are testing waters here, heading for uncharted territories. 
Who knows whether we’ll land in India or America — but even 
fundamental misdirection, as the example of Columbus’ journey 
shows, can yield a reward. The fundamental reason for taking such an 
approach, however, is not an epistemological but an ethical one: We 
cannot always “prove” our moral intuitions, but we can still live by 
them. Furthermore, I claim that we can never prove the superiority of 
one world view over another (see Feyerabend 1975; Kuhn 1964; Rorty 
1980), we can only show (as Wittgenstein put it) the difference that it 
makes, and the meaning that it gives, to our lives; such modest 
skepticism be permitted to us even after radical, Cartesian skepticism 
is dispensed with.  
I share Irwin S. Bernstein’s pragmatic attitude towards concepts, 
theories and world views: “Theories are neither right nor wrong, only 
more or less useful” (Bernstein 1990: 54). It may be useful to think that 
animals have minds, or that I do. 
So, the nine “points” stated above are not meant to be taken as 
logical axioms, or as water-tight pronouncements. Instead, they are 
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meant to open up the entangled problematics of our curious, and 
curiously out-of-date, epistemological tradition — moving us beyond 
category dualism where “cognition” and “behaviour” are assumed to 
live in worlds separated by a non-crossable barrier.  
 
 
3. Some epistemological assumptions  
in cognitive ethology 
 
[W]e cannot know with the mind of a chimpanzee [...]. (Goodall 1990: 11) 
 
That same question recurs in ethological literature constantly. It 
usually goes something like this: “What passes in the mind of a 
bowerbird [...]?” (Frisch 1974: 244) It is my opinion that while there is 
certain truth to the epistemological skepticism found in these two 
statements (and countless like them), we would be better off framing 
the question differently. How do we do it? First, we need to wipe the 
slate clean. 
In this chapter, in order to claim that indeed we can know (theo-
retically) the mind of a chimpanzee, we shall take a look at three case 
studies of how philosophical assumptions, dualistic categorizations 
and epistemological quandaries arise to obfuscate the problem even in 
well-meaning ethological literature. Without pretending that we can 
answer any of the problems that arise, at least we can pinpoint them, 
trace their roots and show how and why problems come about. We can 
also expose some of the contradictions and impossibilities that arise if 
we take these questions seriously. This way, cognitive behaviourism 
arises as the relatively sane approach in comparison. 
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3.1. Frans de Waal 
 
If humans and other primates show similar behavior, does that make the 
apes look smarter, assuming that they put as much cognition into their 
actions as we do? Or does it make us look dumber? (Frans de Waal 2001: 
4; my italics) 
 
This is a good and important question. However, let us take a closer 
look at the interjection: “assuming that they put as much cognition into 
their actions as we do”. The idea behind this statement can be 
analytically dissected in the following way: 
1) Actions (behaviour) and cognition (mentality) are assumed to be 
paired, but somehow observationally disjoined in animals: we only 
see their behaviour, not their minds (allegedly). 
2) In humans, on the other hand, such disjunction is assumed to be 
epistemologically non-problematic. In other words, our thoughts 
(intentions) are seen to be the antecedents (causes) of our actions 
(which are then seen as the consequences, in de Waal’s phrase, of 
‘putting cognition into action’). This assumption has many 
problems. For one, this causative theory of human cognition fails 
to account for unmotivated actions, instinctual drives, sub-
conscious or automated impulses, fluctuating and ambiguous 
thinking patterns (which we may have little control over), the 
social determinants of action and behaviour, the role of guesswork 
and randomizing of intentional expectations to suit the 
circumstances, etc… — that is, the whole reality of human 
consciousness interacting with, and not only imposing its will on, 
the environment. The human mind is seen to be “on the driver’s 
seat” (something that Freud, Nietzsche and Marx and others would 
have criticized). Our actions are said to follow unequivocally from 
this free-willed choice maker. This is the mind of the average, 
normal human being (apparently). 
3) Now, let us follow the thought experiment to its conclusions. 
Behaviour is seen to be distinct from cognition. But, as often is the 
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case and the actions (behaviours) are the same (or similar) in 
animals and humans — like scratching or urinating — is there any 
point in valuing the human action higher than the primate 
counterpart, just because (allegedly) “more cognition was put into 
it” — even when from a behavioural perspective there is no 
difference? Somehow, it seems, we value the human side more, not 
only because we love humans more, but because the human being 
is (supposedly) “in control” of his or her actions and habits. Often, 
the similarities between ape (or some other animal) and human 
behaviour are dismissed as ethically incomparable because of our 
assumed internal differences. But what is this difference? This, for 
me, is the problem: if behavioural similarities between two species 
can be overlooked based on a priori (largely unmeasurable) 
assumptions about internal states, and if differences, too,  
are seen as evidence of unbridgeable dissimilarities between our  
“ontological” or “cognitive” make-up, what, then, in the absence  
of a miracle, could conceivably count as evidence towards 
strengthening the hypothesis of animal cognition, if animal beha-
viour won’t do? To phrase it differently, what could be the 
conditions of falsifiability (cf. Popper) of the “cognitive superio-
rity” argument? There do not seem to be any; these are simply 
different (unfalsifiable) world views. 
4) If cognition (whether as intention or self-awareness) qualifies 
behaviour with an imbued ethical “essence” (soul, mind, cogito), 
does it not follow that behaviour is seen as either the consequence 
or an accidental corollary of this disembodied “cognitive I”? Let us 
take them one by one.  
If behaviour is the consequence — the result — of cognition, 
then behaviour should be traceable to its causes, that is, to corres-
ponding antecedent mental states (intentions, emotive triggers, 
“wilful” operations on the world). Theoretically, this should apply 
to all behaviour, across all species of life. Then we shouldn’t have 
any qualms with endowing apes (or bumblebees, for that matter) 
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with cognitive powers — that is, cognitive power proportional to 
(the complexity of) their behaviour. In this interpretation, human 
beings have cognitive powers proportional to the tasks we set for 
ourselves to perform; apes, then, would have cognitive powers 
proportional to their tasks, behaviour, life journeys, etc… Because 
if behaviour is seen as the end result of “putting cognition into 
action”, then cognition (of a kind) is the sine qua non for any 
(animate) behaviour, almost by definition. What else could 
(human) behaviour be the effect of, if (human) mentality is seen as 
unilaterally causative? After all, if we really “intend” things and 
achieve them, then those things that happen are the causative effect 
of the mind’s setting things into motion.  
But of course almost nobody subscribes to this kind of absolute 
idealism. Still, it happens to be the logical consequence of assuming, 
a) that human behaviour is mentally endowed, and b) that this 
mental endowment acts causatively (so-called “Free Will”), and c) 
that all behaviour can only have one cause (or “trigger” in beha-
viourist jargon). The resulting conclusion — that human behaviour 
can only be caused by corresponding mental trigger states — 
implies that either animal behaviour is also caused by mental cues, 
or else we need to come up with a completely new and different 
explanation as to why animals have behaviour at all (because 
behaviour, after all, has to be caused by something, by some “one 
thing” — for argument’s sake). In other words, the gulf between 
humans and other animals is not only that we have cognition and 
they do not, but that “we” and “they” operate on completely 
different causative and functional planes altogether!  
This seems to be an untenable conclusion because of our 
shared origins: how could two things that have evolved from a 
common ancestor (say, chimpanzees and humans) have developed 
two completely different “operating schemes” (for example, “con-
scious motivation” in humans and “instinctual drives” in animals)? 
Again, the question is not whether humans have behaviour “plus” 
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cognition, but whether this cognition is either a necessary or 
sufficient condition for behaviour (because behaviour can exist 
without cognition and, allegedly — at least according to Descartes 
and Plato — cognition can exist without behaviour). If cognition is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient (explanatory or efficacious) 
cause of behaviour, this puts into question whether human 
behaviour can be ethically judged at all (because it could just be 
random firings of neurons and muscle contractions and social 
pressures and subconscious fantasies and so on) — and, inversely, 
whether it is not a grave mistake to exclude prima facie primate 
behaviour from comparative cognitive studies. Ape behaviour, 
after all, could be the result of motivational thoughts. We might 
even find in animals signs of the “being-in-the-worldness” of an 
epistemological cogito, the transcendental ego of Descartes. But 
didn’t we start our analysis from a criticism of the “isolated 
Cartesian ego” (Fisher 1990: 113)? Whether we see it in humans or 
apes is not the point; we should criticize the concept more funda-
mentally. 
5) We have still to consider the other extreme alternative. Remember, 
we still have the option that behaviour (in humans) is an 
“accidental” corollary, or double, of cognitive states. We can call 
this the Two Worlds Hypothesis because it believes in the dualism 
of thought and action in the same “time-space” of the real world. 
This would leave the door open to the possibility that animals and 
humans share the same ancestry and causative-operational-
functional (evolutionary) make-up, but, at the same time, affirm 
the “metaphysical” or categorical “surplus” of human cognition, 
which endows behaviour with an ethico-spiritual dimension that 
animals (for whatever reason) do not have. Behaviour, then, would 
be caused by roughly the same triggers and biophysical 
perturbations (not to mention Darwinian selective pressures) in 
both animals and humans, but that somehow this “physical” reality 
would not matter, because the cognitive superiority of human 
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animals would “cast a spell” on the material substratum and throw 
an ethical dimension into play, as the figurative icing on the cake, 
which allegedly acts as an “intervening cause” (deus ex machina) 
that glorifies or sanctifies any behaviour — even presumably, the 
act of urination and defecation — beyond the “merely animal”. 
Cognition — word we like to apply to ourselves — casts an aura of 
mystification over our behaviour. Even flatulence is endowed with 
spiritual meaning, because it happens to us, not to those dumb 
monkeys. See my point? As Desmond Morris writes (1967: 21), in 
his typically facetious way, “even a space ape must urinate”.  
 
I believe that this idea (of seeing ourselves as spiritual beings over and 
above nature) is a relic of simpler times, of pre-Darwinian intuition. 
But now we face the double task of “bridging the gap from two ends”: 
we need to both see our own cognition as behaviourally (materially, 
externally, phylogenetically) conditioned, and to see “their” — that is, 
animal — behaviour as cognitively (mentally, internally, ontogene-
tically) conditioned. Only then will we approach some inquisitive 
balance. This way, we bridge the gap between cognitivism and beha-
viourism and stretch the “empirical data” on a continuum and also 
open our hearts and open our minds to the possibility of a non-
judgmental inter-species dialogue. 
 
 
3.2. Desmond Morris 
 
After all, these encounters with our closest relatives can teach us un-
expected things about ourselves. By studying bonobos, for example — 
whom Frans de Waal (2001: 41) calls “these ‘make love, not war’ 
primates” we may rekindle our appreciation for the innate human 
capacity to “evolve[…] peaceful societies” (de Waal 2001: 41) and, 
indeed, to flaunt and ritualize “the prominent social role of sex” (de 
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Waal 2001: 67). They, like we do, embrace the “non-reproductive use 
of sex” (de Waal 2001: 68) as a cultural pleasure.  
The fact of the cultural use of sex makes nonsense of the 
biologically deterministic claims of those who, like Desmond Morris at 
times, revert to heavy-handedly normativizing our biological make-up. 
While it is appropriate to say that “the inherited qualities of more than 
a million years of human evolution cannot be cleared away overnight” 
(Morris 1982: 382) and that “[b]ehind the façade of modern city life 
there is the same old naked ape” (1967: 74), Morris goes way too far in 
his biological determinism when he argues (see 1967: 82–87) that the 
urge to procreate is not only a deep-seated drive but an actual 
normative standard, from which perspective he can criticize “aberrant” 
(Morris 1967: 87), “unsound” (ibid.) and “reproductively wasteful 
activities” (Morris 1967: 84). To be sure, he doesn’t attack casual sex or 
what he calls “play[ing] the field” (Morris 1967: 85) as such — as long 
as these remain as casual encounters that do not interfere with 
heteronormative pair bonding. In some cases, he claims, people can 
actually become damaged; as in the case of permanent homosexuali-
ty — which he thinks is “biologically unsound” (Morris 1967: 87) 
behaviour. For him, “homosexuals are […], in a reproductive sense, 
aberrant” (Morris 1967: 87). Certainly I cannot agree with him here. 
The commonness of non-reproductive sexuality in bonobo societies 
(see de Waal 2001: 41–68) turns the tables against Morris’ grim 
estimation: “Bonobos engage in sex in virtually every partner combi-
nation: male-male, male-female, female-female, male-juvenile, female-
juvenile, and so on” (de Waal 2001: 52). All sorts of non-procreative 
hetero- and homo-sexual favours — from full-on penetration and 
“scrotal rubbing” (de Waal 2001: 49) to kissing — are commonplace 
activities among bonobo communities, especially during feeding time 
frenzy and post-conflict reconciliation — that is, daily. Sex, in “every 
imaginable position and variation” (de Waal 2001: 52) — is used a 
means of peace-making and diplomacy. Bonobos, overall, seem to use 
arousal as a means of maintaining social cooperation and peace in 
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situations where competitive tendencies might otherwise break out 
into violence (de Waal 2001: 48–49). I say we still have a lot to learn 
from these creatures whose cognitive life too, it seems, is equipped to 
handle never-ending heat, making them more like us than we will 
easily admit. 
Morris, too, could learn a thing or two from bonobos. Sexuality, as 
it happens, has evolved many different functions in society, pro-
creation being only one of them. The old lie of the Social Darwinist 
Right, that biology determines morality, lives on in The Naked Ape’s 
inventive but sinfully simplifying account of the origins of human 
behaviour. The old Humean dictum, “you cannot make an ‘ought’ 
from an ‘is’”, should help us vaccinate ourselves against such scholarly 
charlatanisms and legerdemain tactics. The descriptive and normative 
levels of analysis should be kept separate, which is something that 
Morris patently fails to do. His “biological determinism” (Morris 1967: 
87) is nothing more than a petty excuse for a socially conservative, 
proto-fascist prejudice. This again serves to prove that behaviourism, 
without the element of freedom, is merely coercive. 
 
 
3.3. Jane Goodall 
 
A rather different sort of evangelizing can be found in Goodall’s 
rhetoric (Goodall 1990). Since we have already noted her tendency to 
take things for granted (using words like clearly, obviously, unhesita-
tingly; see pages 16–17) rather than trying, strictly speaking, to prove 
her “personal convictions [that] were, indeed, difficult to prove” (16), 
it comes as no surprise when, only a few lines after having stated (the 
obvious but epistemologically irrelevant fact) that “we cannot know 
with the mind of a chimpanzee” (Goodall 1990: 11), she expresses her 
hope that “one day, we shall be able to see even more clearly into the 
mind of the chimpanzee” (Goodall 1990: 11; my italics). But wait a 
minute. If we “cannot know with the mind of a chimpanzee”, how is it 
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possible ever (in a million years) to “see even more clearly” into it, to 
penetrate it from without, even after all the knowledge and anecdotal 
data in the world has been collected? Clearly there is a contradiction, 
or a paradox, here. Can it be resolved? 
Of course, her book is intended for the general public and is largely 
autobiographical, so it may be unfair to subject it to rigorous analysis 
such as we may direct at an academic paper. Nonetheless I think it is 
fair to ask, why does she feel the need to state, categorically, that “we 
cannot know” the mind of another animal from within (because, 
allegedly, they have internal access to it but we do not), and yet at the 
same time — and on the same page — claim that one day knowing 
their minds shall be possible, that it is possible? This is the paradox. It 
is both possible and impossible at the same time. No wonder that 
cognitive ethology has been heavily criticized! But I think this is based 
on a typical Western category mistake. If (and only if) we separate 
behaviour (the recorded ethological data) from cognition (the un-
knowable “something” behind all observable data, behind the veil of 
senses), we are indeed left with an irresolvable dilemma: either we say 
the animal mind does not exist (like Descartes), or that we cannot 
prove it (like Goodall). But if we do not draw a sharp distinction 
between mind and body, between cognition and behaviour, we are 
saved from such paradoxes! Goodall’s own caveat, that we cannot 
know “with” other minds, does not change the fact that we can, in fact, 
know their minds with our own minds, without any Cartesian or 
Kantian residue of a priori impenetrability. The matter becomes a 
purely empirical question, to be solved through ethological study. 
In other words, I think all the necessary evidence, and all the 
necessary signs, are there. Goodall herself, upon witnessing a specimen 
who appears to be elated, writes about this unity of observation and 
truth: “There are few observers who would not unhesitatingly ascribe 
his behavior to be a happy, carefree state of well being” (Goodall 1990: 
16–17; my italics). For the present observer, the animal’s elation bursts 
through its behaviour; it becomes an immediate, a manifest truth of 
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perception. Indeed: its behavior is (in) a state of happiness! The 
happiness is in the behaviour. To observe a given behaviour is to 
observe “a happy carefree state of well being” (Goodall 1990: 16–17) 
because emotions and cognitive processes are not (necessarily or 
entirely) internal and hidden. There is no invisible veil separating the 
observer and the observed. Of course, in this case (or any number of 
other cases — even most of the time) she might be mistaken, but that 
doesn’t change the picture. The point is not that the observer can be 
wrong, but that she can be correct. Any categorical epistomological 
disunion is a myth. Studying animal minds is no different than, say, 
studying their mating patterns or schedules of trains. 
This way we can recognize and study the animals’ “essential Being-
ness” (Goodall 1990: 15), without taking anything for granted — 
certainly not the idea that “we cannot know” other minds because, it is 
said, we cannot penetrate their internal states; I claim that there’s 
nothing stopping us. 
  
 
3.4. Donald R. Griffin 
 
It is very easy to take things for granted, or to cede too much to public 
opinion or philosophical trends. Even Donald R. Griffin, in his 
analysis of different forms of mentality, bows to “a full recognition of 
the enormous superiority of human mentality” (Griffin 1990: xiv). 
Two problems here: the words “superiority” and its “enormity”. Let us 
take them one-by-one.  
The word “superiority”… First of all, can mentality (whatever it 
means) be scaled hierarchically? If so, how? Can we say that dogs’ 
brains (and mental capacities) are ‘superior’ to a wild bull’s? Can we 
say a dolphin’s brains are “superior” to an orangutan’s, or vice versa? 
Superior in regards to what purpose, to what end? As we know from 
nature, the selection processes that wean and sculpture bio-organisms 
are subject to adaptive pressures that are context, locus and niche 
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specific. We would have to assume some biospheric-universal telos — 
be it God or Man or Gaia — if we want to compare all species 
according to some fixed yardstick. The “superiority” that Griffin is 
talking about is undoubtedly the manifest dominance of man over its 
competitors, underlings and coinhabitants. The highly adaptive 
advances that man has made over natural fluxes of pests, hardships 
and acclimatization pressures have clearly been the result of increased 
mental capacity, especially as directed towards social co-operation and 
communication, as well as rational reasoning and frontal lobe thinking.  
However, even this “superiority” is only relative, as is becoming 
increasingly clear with the prospect of mankind being on the verge of 
blowing itself up due to nuclear bombs, overpopulation and climate 
change. It has been said that, in the worst case scenario of mankind’s 
extinction, “the rats will outlive us” — and if this is so, how can we 
assert our (adaptive, mental — let alone absolute) ‘superiority’ over the 
dumb little rat? After all, as Morris (1967: 196) wisely says: “To the 
zoologist, all animals are, or should be, equally interesting”. We have 
to be very careful with using man’s standards to measure nature’s 
variability. If we want to compare and “rate” mental achievements and 
capacities “objectively”, we have to do it from a particular selective-
adaptive viewpoint (as in the case of multiple species competing for 
some limited resource in a given niche). Even more rigorously, we 
may want to compare specific brain structures and architectural 
similarities in the “design” of a range of genetically related organisms 
and look for patterns of differentiation and emerging complexity 
which may tell us about the possibilities and impossibilities of a given 
central nervous system for completing certain tasks, achieving certain 
objectives and, perhaps, emoting in a predictable and measurable way. 
DNA-similarities and “gene tree” branchings are the blueprint for 
systematic study here, and all “superiority” is only superiority of 
specialization. Many interesting pointers in anatomical studies exist. 
De Waal, for example, points out that bonobos seem to have a rather 
“humanlike distinction of special neurons in the frontal cortex” (de 
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Waal 2001: 43). The following conclusions drawn by Richard W. 
Byrne (Byrne 2001) seem to further demystify the “superiority” of 
human intelligence: 
1. “[M]onkeys and apes have brains that are on average twice as 
large as those of a typical mammal of equivalent body size” (Byrne 
2001: 158). This puts us in a privileged category, but with some 
unwanted company. This implies that we are not so far from “the rest” 
as we might think. 
2. Moreover, certain “carnivores and cetaceans” (Byrne 2001: 153) 
have developed, apparently through convergent evolution, the 
capacity for big brains and some level of measurable intelligence. So 
much for the uniqueness of human gifts, if even “higher cognition” 
can develop multiple times! 
3. Perhaps most importantly, the “enlarged neocortex” (Byrne 
2001: 149) of monkeys develops, when it comes to the great apes 
(apparently), the capacity for “some understanding of intentions and 
causes [and this] comprehension is based on an ability to perceive, and 
to build, complex novel behavior” (Byrne 2001: 149). Here, in “the 
nonlinguistic mind” (Byrne 2001: 151), we have what Byrne thinks are 
the fundamental beginnings and rudiments of complex thought and 
language. If language begins as rudimentary model construction, then 
human language, with its complex syntax, is far from being the “gift of 
the gods” that it’s often claimed to be — any more than fire, or cooking, 
or pair bonding. He summarizes his position: “The underlying cogni-
tive superiority of great apes over monkeys might best be described as 
a difference in forming and manipulating mental representations” 
(Byrne 2001: 168). Here it is very easy to think about Uexküll or 
Sebeok: “Manipulation of these data structures in the mind amounts 
to mental simulation of the world” (Byrne 2001: 168). If this is true, 
then the origins of language have been discovered. After all, we should 
remember that for Sebeok, language is first and foremost a model-
building capacity, and only secondarily a communicative capacity. 
Byrne’s efforts to sketch out pre-human models of cognitive compe-
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tence are highly intriguing and deserve further study and elaboration. 
Perhaps these next few years will be a watershed moment in our 
understanding of language, cognition and the evolutionary stages of 
primate development. 
Back to the phrase “enormous superiority”. My obvious second 
gripe is with the word “enormous” that qualifies the (in-itself proble-
matic) word “superiority”… It is not as if any enormous difference 
between human beings and, say, great apes is a given fact. If we believe 
in the emerging consensus that the structural (DNA-specific), social 
and cognitive modalities of all known primates present more like a 
continuum (punctuated, to be sure, by the linguistic and semiotic 
innovations of Homo Sapiens) than a god-given separation, then we 
can question the smug wisdom in taking the “enormity” of our 
separation from our next of kin for granted. It smacks of a “speciest” 
remark and a mind-soothing but unforgivable prejudice we tell our 
children at night. And if the fact of emotions in “lower mammals” 
(like rats and dogs) and higher cognition in sea mammals (dolphins 
using mirrors and individuated call signals) are added to the picture — 
not to mention the whole hullabaloo of ASL and computer trained 
great apes — we are left with a deeply perplexing, radically new way of 
looking at the world and our place in it. Then no longer can we say, at 
least not without hesitation, that “[o]f course human thinking is 
astronomically more complex and versatile than that of other species” 
(Griffin 1990: xiv-xv, my italics). More complex? Perhaps. More 
versatile? Almost certainly. But the differences are not “astronomical” 
as much as perfectly, undeniably down-to-earth: humans and apes are 
evolutionary siblings, years, not light-years, apart. 
“Behind the façade of modern city life there is the same old naked 
ape” (Morris 1967: 74). This sensationalist claim is pretty accurate: 
“Not only are chimpanzees and bonobos genetically our closest rela-
tives, the reverse is also true; that is, chimpanzees and bonobos are 
closer to us than to, say, gorillas” (de Waal 2001: 2).  The closeness of 
our bond to these animals (with their complex emotional lives and 
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social bonds) has led the biologist Jared Diamond, for example, to 
argue that “we should be placed in the same genus as chimpanzees and 
bonobos, making us the ‘third chimpanzee’” (referred to in Pusey 
2001: 11).  
This fact becomes very apparent in ethological field work; as 
Goodall states: “Some of the emotional states of the chimpanzees are 
so obviously similar to ours that even an inexperienced observer can 
understand what is going on” (Goodall 1990: 16). 
Even human language has its roots and origins in a common 
ancestor. I fully agree with Charles T. Snowdon’s “empiricist approach 
to language origins that establishes language as the current end point 
of a continuum of communication abilities” (Snowdon 2001: 226). 
This flies against Sebeok’s world view, but also against Chomsky’s 
unverifiable universal grammar theory and other Cartesian assump-
tions about “magical” human cognitive capacities. Whatever the ratio-
nalist philosopher may want to think and believe, “[t]he discontinuity 
theory is implausible because evolution [proceeds] only by accretion 
of beneficial variants of what went before. Language is a unique yet 
highly complex adaptation” (my italics) so that it cannot be “comple-
tely unrelated to the cognition of other species” (Byrne 1990: 148). 
So striking is the human-ape connection, both cognitive and beha-
vioural, that elsewhere Frans de Waal writes that “[b]onobos standing 
upright […] resemble an artist’s impression of Australopithecus” (de 
Waal 2001: 44). Bonobos even engage in the all-too-human practice of 
“face to face copulation” (de Waal 2001: 51) — a sure sign of civili-
zation as we know it. We have already mentioned their propensity for 
sexual pleasures and pastimes of all kinds, both homo- and hetero-
sexual. Here the connection to human behaviour (and cognition) is 
undeniably clear. As Morris writes of mankind’s double standards: 
“He is proud that he has the biggest brain of all the primates, but 
attempts to conceal the fact that he also has the biggest penis” (Morris 
1967: 9).  
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What are the fundamental motives that drive human cognition/ 
behaviour? Surely not copulation and biological procreation? Is our 
human sense of lofty liberty drenched, secretly, in the pleasures of sex? 
The thought is too much for public decency to bear. This kind of 
mystification and birthing of cultural taboos is, frankly, to be expected 
from a society unsure of its origins and deeply shameful of its gifts. 
What is the difference between liberty (freedom) and libertinism 
(following one’s instincts, that is, un-freedom)? I claim that there is no 
difference. Freedom is behaving (towards the fulfilment of biological 
and cultural and personal imperatives). Cognition, on the whole, can 
best be explained as behavioural patterning. 
In other words, the mind is the machine. This dualism simply can-
not hold: freedom (cognition + responsiveness) and obligation (nature 




4. Language and cognition:  
Are we the special species? 
 
How, then, does freedom come to be seen as A) unique to humans and 
B) separate from our organic, biological constitution? How does the 
mind come to be seen in this light? 
The consensus opinion, often implicit but also quite often flaunted 
with pride, is that there is some unique quality to humans, some 
special stuff that separates us from the rest of the animal kingdom. 
More often than not that special something is given a name: language.  
According to Sebeok, “language” is a name that properly should 
only be applied to the human modelling system, as opposed to other, 
generally communicative and less “mental” systems that other animals 
quite frequently evolve to employ: “That language is a biotic property 
specific to man is true — a truism even” (Sebeok 1981: 210 — the very 
first sentence of the chapter). Clearly, he says, chimpanzees or great 
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apes cannot be taught language (that is, ASL), because language, 
categorically, is a dimension of the human Umwelt alone.  
Now, whatever the empirical reality of the pedagogic human-
animal relationship in the case of Washoe, Koko and others — I would 
argue that the evidence is much more convincing than Sebeok admits 
(see Martinelli 2007: 230–275) — Sebeok’s argument here (actually 
more like knee-jerk reaction), seems to rest on a bundle of inter-
connected assumptions and prejudices, what I would call the “Special 
Species” argument, that is, the assumption that humans are “animals 
who … X, Y and Z”. Now, whatever that something — that “X/Y/Z” — 
may be, it is always something more than our “animal nature”, more 
than our next of kin. Human soul, then, is made out of some special 
stuff (for example res cogitans). We are given an immortal soul or a 
transcendental ego. 
The idea of a minimal — but fundamental and unbridgeable — gap 
between Us and Them, in another words the presence of some extra-
natural surplus in the Homo Sapiens’ bio-cognitive make-up (some 
“spark of the divine”) is a common enough claim in the realm of 
contemporary human society, science and religion. It is also all that 
many people need in order to reject out of hand any horizontal 
(“fraternizing” or participatory) conceptualization of the biosphere. 
The “human vs. animal” model is prone to produce strictly vertical 
(“patronizing” or dominatory) hierarchical schemes where humans 
are on top, either by design or conquest. 
The argument form conquest simply states that humans are 
superior to animals because of our superior skills or greater success. 
We are de facto superior. Our superiority could be simply the result of 
our greater physical ability and our warlikeness. Many Social Dar-
winists subscribe to this view, although they often see our brains as 
our best weapons. 
The argument from (natural or divine) design is much more perni-
cious. In Genesis, men and animals are created unequal. This diffe-
rence is God’s command. Likewise, in Cartesian philosophy man is 
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inherently different from animals (which are little more than machi-
nes). We are de jure categorically, metaphysically superior. 
These two theories are both wrong, I think, but at least we can 
recognize de facto inferiority (e.g. the powerlessness of small tribes in 
the face of Westernization or the powerlessness of hedgehogs in the 
face of tractors) without postulating any a priori or metaphysical 
“natural” difference. The play on the word “natural” is crucial. We 
think that what is “natural” is supposedly unfree, but this is precisely 
what I want to argue against. We do not need to embrace Pavlovian 
behaviourism to disavow a dualism of substances where a soul or a 
mind is postulated as the differentiating principle that endows 
humanity its cosmic centre place. 
Anthropocentrism emerges out of the European-American intel-
lectual heritage of language-centrism. The centrality of the logos and 
the cosmic centrality of man as “the animal that speaks” are closely 
intertwined problems. Because of their “dumbness” (in the double 
meaning of mute and stupid), philosophers have not thought about 
“animals” at all as subjects. In the case of the ASL language acquisition 
of apes, for example, Sebeok’s skepticism is not empirical, but 
categorical and philosophical. Sebeok’s dissonance, in this regard, with 
the emerging empirical reality is clearer today than ever, when the 
fields of musicology (cf. Martinelli), architecture and sociology of 
animals are gaining ever growing ground. Even deeper than that: the 
Cartesian position (which supports the equation, mind=language= 
mind), in Richard W. Byrne’s words, the idea that “[h]umans alone are 
quite different because they possess language which underlies every 
major intellectual achievement of humanity” (in Byrne 2001: 148), is 
heavily outdated. According to this problematic view, held on tight by 
Sebeok and others, there exists “an animal whose awareness is not 
wholly tied to biological constitution” (Deely 2001: 6): Homo sapiens. I 
claim that this view is based on little evidence. 
It is a prejudice reinforced by repetition and tradition. We have a 
gut feeling that there exists a body-soul division. This idea has been a 
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conceptual part of the intellectual history of the West since Aristotle’s 
definition of man as zoon logon echon. It is a deeply felt intuition that 
there exists a breach between our bodies and our minds, whereby the 
very existence of the inner world is seen to justify a certain amount of 
ego-solipsism, which in turn leads to species-solipsism (via the 
persuasive powers of social interaction and the quite biologically 
determined co-operative instinct which leads us to bond with our 
DNA relatives both in thought as in action), a.k.a. species-centrism — 
in fact anthropocentrism and culture-centrism. In this regard, the 
concept of a linguistic-psychological other-worldliness is part of the 
inherited, unreflected set of beliefs that any child born into the 
industrial West will learn at an early age. Since the modus operandi of 
the Mind is seen to be rational thinking, and the modus operandi of 
rational thinking is supposed to be linguistic performance 3 , in 
philosophy there has been little factual distinction between philosophy 
of the mind (psychology) and philosophy of the language (linguistics). 
Human beings have an inner capacity for self-reflection, and this 
capacity is, by nature, linguistic. The first possible consequence of this 
is clear. If we assume that other animals do not think (rationally), they 
cannot have a language (quite like ours). The alternative, equally 
pernicious, consequence is that, if we assume that other animals do 
not have a language (quite like we do), then it follows that they cannot 
think (rationally). 
We are led to believe that introspection, because it seems possible, 
reveals the existence of a uniquely autonomous Inner Zone. But this 
Inner Zone (or Innenwelt) is simply a local manifestation of a global 
biosemiosphere, a confluence of influences expressing itself as a lo-
calised semiotic Web, a phenotypic instantiation of the larger natural 
processes of variation, speciation and individuation (discussed in the 
next chapters). Our failure to see “freedom” as a general principle of 
                                                 
3  A line of reasoning heavily criticized by people such as Freud, Jung, Kristeva, 
Žižek and Derrida.  
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nature is caused by a mistake on the level of our language and psycho-
semantics. The “free” (that is, stochastic) combination of linguistic 
material within a human being (a person’s performative capacity as a 
speaker and a writer, as measured, for example, by Chomsky’s genera-
tive grammar competency) should not be confused with any system-
transcendent freedom (a person’s alleged meta-capacity for world-
disengagement as a soul). Since this is an important point, I shall 
rephrase it: freedom of thought, which expresses itself as a radically 
unpredictable “trace of the author” in text (or, more broadly, in 
semiosis) forces us to posit an inherent mystery at the heart of our 
being, an unexplainable something. In Deely’s (2001: 6) words, “what 
we will say in [a] language” remains underdetermined. We can neither 
explain the “poetic freedom” of artists nor the linguistic versatility of 
our young… In a way, we out-smart ourselves. We try hard to explain 
language through language, which is ultimately impossible. Since we 
cannot hope to explain or describe our linguistic expressions without 
using linguistic expressions (for example, “cogito ergo sum”), we easily 
fall to solipsism.  Language and cognition are, to some extent, self-
referential and self-transcending mechanisms for producing un-
predictability and novelty. I will argue (in the next chapter) that such 
free mechanisms are biologically determined — determined to be free. 
If it is true, as Robin I. M. Dunbar argues (in an article called Brain 
on Two Legs, Dunbar 2001: 175–191), that “we probably owe our 
success as a species to our sociality” and to “culturally transmitted 
solutions" (Dunbar 2001: 175), it is no wonder that an ideology of 
species-centrism (especially in its stronger variants) has had adaptive 
value for a community of language-users. Language, after all, is a 
means whereby social identity and “culturally transmitted solutions” 
most often are spread (at least in highly communicative, rather than 
imitative, human societies). Since language, by definition, excludes the 
voices of non-speakers, should we be surprised that ideologies trans-
mitted by its means tend to develop a “pro-speaker” (selfish) bias? 
Furthermore, if this is compounded by the social benefits that such an 
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ideological solution might bring (because it fosters “in-group” solida-
rity and, consequently, social harmony), as a survival strategy for a 
species that is in competition with “non-language-using” societies and 
communities, it is quite obvious that the project of “equipping” ani-
mals with communicative and modelling skills (semiotic/linguistic 
fluency) is to be met with some hostility, disbelief and cognitive 
dissonance on an individual basis; and on the community scale, as well, 
it is likely to meet considerable political (that is, mammalian DNA 
social) opposition, from the vested interest of preferring the in-group 
to the out-group. Our language, after all, is a means of “speaking 
among ourselves” and to ourselves, from our perspective as social 
information processing systems. To be sure, exposing such an open-
ended bias does not prove that animals have mind, any more than its 
opposite, but it serves to remind us of the dangers we face. And indeed, 
“studies of the content of naturally occurring conversations suggest 
that we typically devote 60-70 percent of our conversation to social 
topics” (Dunbar 2001: 191). During that 60-70 percent, we have to 
appear likeable, and liking, to the other person. This explains why lan-
guage favours pro-ingroup (socializing) and anti-outgroup (“stranger-
izing”) strategies and topics. Foreigners, as well as minorities, women, 
children and animals, have been systematically at the receiving end of 
this. The politics of speech, of course, is an increasing subject of study 
in sociolinguistics. Perhaps this might serve to remind us of the animal 
origins of communication. Wolves, for example, as social beings, like 
to communicate to their kin, but can be tamed and domesticated to 
develop new kinship strategies to other species (including humans and 
cats). The same with the human animal: only education and liberali-
zation of society can counterweigh the naturally suspicious and selfish 
nature of social discourse among “socialized” adult human beings. 
To return to the quote from Karl von Frisch: “What passes in the 
mind of a bowerbird when he builds and decorates his bower? Na-
turally, I cannot answer [my own] question. No one can. [… Still, in 
bowerbirds] not only insight into the consequences of their actions but 
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also evidence of aesthetic feeling are found” (Frisch 1974: 244–245). 
But that is just one example (see, for example, Nagel 1974). One need 
not list all the animals that “have cognition” as if they were “card 
carrying members” of the Cognitive Club. Instead, one should try to 
prove a cognitive continuum through persuasive examples and rea-
soning. After all, if we can prove (beyond reasonable doubt) that 
animals as a kingdom are capable of freedom of choice, freedom of 
expression and freedom of movement, then the special place of human 
beings as a species is put into question. Freedom, it seems, is a 
biological privilege, a programmatic endowment of the DNA code, not 
a result of “awareness [...] not wholly tied to biological constitution”, 
in Deely’s (2001: 6) loosely dualistic phrase (echoing not only Sebeok 
but Chomsky, Descartes and Aristotle).  
Biology is not the enemy, or antithesis, of cognition. Behaviourism 
and spiritualism are the two antipodes of stripped down dualism. Life, 
in these barren ideologies, is reduced to a single, dead principle — be 
it life without substance or substance without life. 
Freedom, if it is to mean anything outside of theology and political 
rhetoric, has to be as the capacity of a species to emit signs which 
betray the presence of some kind of originator, or source of action. 
Freedom is the capacity to be observed as a stochastic (i.e. un-
predictable) centre of semiotic Innenwelt/Umwelt-metabolism. We 
cannot know about things except as objects (as Kant proposed; see also 
Deely 2001). By the same token, I do not even know if I, myself, am 
“really” free — it only seems that way, and I’m ready to act accordingly, 
to behave “as if” I do have freedom. The same with animals: we cannot 
prove freedom, only observe it. When an animal (apparently) acts like 
a source of self-directed sign processing (that is, a dog that does not 
salivate when Pavlov rings the bell in eager anticipation4), we may call 
                                                 
4  To paraphrase Dario Martinelli’s thought experiment, how can we be sure that 
it is the dog that has been put under the spell of conditioning and not the 
behaviourist instructor? After all, with surprising regularity, the white-coated  
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it a bio-computer regulating its own sign-economy. But when we say 
this, we should remember the human being is likewise a bio-
computer; again, if narrowly defined. I am in line with Julien Offray de 
la Mettrie, whose concept of l’homme machine, while somewhat 
reductionist, does not entail a radical break between the animal king-
dom and Homo sapiens, nor does its mechanical worldview deny the 
mental life of either animals or humans (as Descartes did); instead, it 
represents a continuity hypothesis of the biosphere, almost proto-
evolutionary in its assumptions and conclusions. Of souls, he said that 
“each animal has his own” (de la Mettrie 1748; unpaged). Coming 
from a self-avowed anti-spiritualist materialist this is quite a statement. 
It can only mean that mechanistic and vitalistic theories can well co-
exist. 
Having examined and rejected the idea of a disembodied free spirit, 
we can look at the mind as a physicalistic, emergent property subject 
to biospheric adaptive pressures. Charles T. Snowdon supports the 
theory of the gradual development of language systems, in his article, 
From Primate Communication to Human Language (Snowdon 2001): 
“The developmental and adult data from nonhuman animals support 
a bottom-up empiricist approach to language origins that establishes 
language as the current end point of a continuum of communication 
abilities” (Snowdon 2001: 226; my italics). He thinks it is simply more 
“parsimonious” (like Bekoff 1995) to assume this is so. “While humans 
do have species-typical adaptations for speech and language, it is not 
necessary to hypothesize special perceptual abilities, special cognitive 
abilities, or special brain structures [contra Chomsky] to support 
language. It is more parsimonious to view these as resulting from the 
increased survival value accruing from the complex communication 
                                                                                                    
two-legged mammal will come out of his lab-hole, with a bell at hand, to feed him. 
And when he eventually rings the bell without giving the poor dog any food, the 
dog must be thinking (in Caninese): “Is this guy serious? What a jerk.” 
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abilities that have evolved during the process of primate evolution" 
(Snowdon 2001: 226–227). 
In other words, language predates man, and so does cognition. 
 
  
5. An evolutionary view of cognition  
in animal behaviour 
 
The main problem, then, for theoretical zoosemiotics (and biology in 
general), we have seen, seems to be the problem of language-centrism, 
and the related issue of the “descriptive bias”. Language is not what 
separates us from the other animals (or even — as Christians and 
Aristotle believed — from all animals as such), except in the trivial 
sense that any Umwelt-specific trait acts as an isolator and a barrier. 
Surely sucking blood differentiates mosquitoes and vampire bats from 
(most) humans, but it does not put either the bat or the mosquito on 
“a higher level” than us. To be sure, the human cognitive-behavioural 
organism is probably the most developed in the world. We are pretty 
amazing — there, I said! But realistically speaking, the Umwelt-
construction of any single species brings with it strengths and weak-
nesses related to specific conditions or sets of bio-physical circumstan-
ces that open up within the context of a species’ Umwelt-Innenwelt 
metabolism. Life involves directing the energies of the surroundings 
into one’s own ends. The weak version of this “bio-egotism” theory 
simply says that life struggles to survive (metaphorically or literally); 
the stronger statement has it that the birth of self-consciousness is a 
direct correlate of the need to self-regulate (actively and wilfully). I 
imply the latter: that consciousness is a rather common and early 
occurrence in natural history. Consciousness comes in degrees: from 
nullity to humanness to (one would assume5) something beyond that. 
                                                 
5  This is simply the result of seeing consciousness as an emerging property of 
the natural world. Unless humans are the final culmination of evolutionary history, 
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The way the mind interprets signals is biologically determined. The 
behaviour that we act out is biologically determined, but not exhausti-
vely pre-programmed. Instead, behaviour and cognition are under-
coded: something remains to chance and contingency. This DNA 
blueprint gives us, as it were, our “scope” of freedom (that is, freedom-
within-parameters-of-possibility). A species’ DNA-given, phylogene-
tically determined freedom accounts for its “behavioural flexibility” 
(Dunbar 2001: 183). Now, if we accept this hypothesis, we have 
reached a position between strict behaviourism and strict cognitivism. 
It is only from such radically null perspective (what Barthes called 
“degree zero” and what Žižek, more recently, has dubbed the “parallax 
view”) that we can begin to criticize statements such as the following: 
 
For when it comes to the human being it is true but not enough to say 
that we live in a bubble wholly determined by our biological consti-
tution. […T]he human modeling system, the Innenwelt underlying and 
correlate with our Umwelt, is, strangely, not wholly tied to our biology. 
[…] When we are born […] what we can see or sense in any direct 
modality is established and determined, just as is the case with any 
animal life form. But what language we will speak or what we will say in 
that language is far from so fixed and determined. (John Deely 2001: 
131–132) 
 
I posit to the contrary that the “Innenwelt underlying and correlate 
with our Umwelt” is wholly tied to our biology and structurally depen-
dent upon it. This is because biology, far from being a fixed thing, is 
precisely a kind of “call” or “permission” or “commandment” to be 
free (in a specific way), that is, to determine the actual consequences of 
our given constitution through our actions. Biology is not the 
                                                                                                    
consciousness has a past and also a future: it is reasonable to assume that our 
evolutionary successors will be more cognitive than us. It is also possible, if not 
probable, that on other planets higher intelligences live. We have no data on that 
yet, but the probability of that being the case rises after each new astronomical 
discovery. Earth-like planets, while rare, seem to be billion-fold in the universe. 
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“opposite” of freedom, but its prerequisite; biology is the architectural 
and structural condition of freedom as such, of unpredictability of 
habituation as such. What, anyway, could be the alternative? Strict 
physicalism assumes too much (or too little), and speculative vitalism 
begs the question. Dualism, on the whole, where the difference 
between the physical and the metaphysical is maintained, hardly 
seems like an enticing alternative anymore, not after its inherent 
contradictions are exposed, and after its Christian sentimentalist slash 
hyper-rationalist paranoid skepticist basis is unveiled. For the pur-
poses of our analysis, without making any greater ontological commit-
ments, we propose a radical monism, which seems like the only way to 
escape dualism. This entails the unity of behaviour and cognition, 
Innenwelt and Umwelt. In other words, behavioural action is freedom. 
To behave is to be free. To be seen to behave “as if” one were free is to 
be free. To behave, systematically and measurably, but always — to 
some extent — unpredictably and stochastically, is the liberty-loving 
“M.O.” of all life on earth.  
All life is in competition with itself, with its different forms: 
“evolution in an ongoing dynamic process” (Bernstein 1990: 38). 
Speciation is variation, as Darwin knew. Variation is modification 
according to selective pressures. “Nature,” in the words of Heraclitus, 
“likes to hide itself” (my own translation of his fragment 123: “φύσις 
κρύπτεσθαι φιλει”). This means that nature, with its many life forms, 
tends and strives to be free (that is, unpredictable, that is, in unique 
“bio-physio-chemical” locomotion/transformation) — for example, 
free of death, first and foremost, but also free of immobility and also 
free of any purely physical, inanimate, “externally defined” pattern — 
as if animals were dead leaves floating down the river in spiralling 
swirls... Animals, after all, are not dead leaves in a river, but sailors of 
their own destinies. Such metaphors, of course, are not to be taken as 
descriptive of the quality of the internal life of animals, but of the 
deep-seated biotic drive towards self-regulatory “I-ness” that regulates 
ontogenetic behaviour and cognition on many levels. To be a “species” 
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implies to be “different”, that is, to be a “variation of form” (across 
some genetic or biomorphic plane); a biological attempt (experiment) 
at embodied structuration of freedom. 
Nature is in constant flux. The very idea of species, as Bernstein 
reminds us, “is a pre-Darwinian concept” that betrays the complexity 
of natural selection; instead, “we will always find species somewhere in 
the process of speciation” (Bernstein 1990: 38). See also John C. 
Fentress’s article in the same volume for a deeper look at “dynamic 
relational and multilayered processes” (Fentress 1990: 28) in animal 
behaviour, as an attempt to explain cognition on the basis of beha-
vioural data.  
Evolution implies deep history (viz. Charles Lyell), so here I will 
propose a suggestive semiotic theory for the birth and development of 
nervous systems and brain-minds out of many evolutionary pre-
cursors and parallel developments. Biomass emerges out of the realm 
of abiotic factors, somehow, and spirals matter into self-governing, 
self-enforcing loops of development. This is the birth of life. The birth 
of such a process may well have been “accidental” in some sense (a 
fluke of history). At any rate, it seems likely that the birth of semiosic 
relationships (viz. Peirce, Sebeok, Deely; the American school of 
semiotics) coincides with the historical emergence of self-directive, 
self-protective and self-defending bio-molecular proto-organisms. It is 
not necessary, here, to recap the (anyway imperfectly understood) 
early evolutionary history whereby prokaryotic organisms complexify 
and develop into eukaryotic and ultimately hierarchically organized 
polykaryotic “cyto-societies” (intra-organistic biospheres) that we 
know today. Clearly the branching of life forms owes its historical 
imperative to the bio-organic diversity of the abiotic conditions 
wherein the mobile niche-seeking cultures of cellular biomass were 
forced to adapt, change and specialize according to the demands of 
each and every locus of development and acculturation. This 
branching is seen as hierarchical, from the large kingdoms, genera, 
phyla and species to the level of sub-species and variation amongst 
Studying the cognitive states of animals  409 
population. So, the true heart of this branching — and its “active 
centre” — is the ultimate singular “event” of species variation (the 
mutation or recombination of inherited material in the form of a new 
species). It is also present in Darwin, where “speciation” is just the 
“variation” of successful forms. Variation benefits the individual by 
giving him as much “freedom” (to adapt, choose, mate, evolve) as 
possible: freedom to make the right choices (to flee from a spider), as it 
were, but also to make mistakes (to flee from a rabbit) and to try to 
evolve. 
So, the individual is the fundamental “localization” of this biotic 
drive towards diversification and multiplicity. The actions, choices 
and cognitive processes of the individual animal are, as it were, the 
vanguard of evolution (lit. “front-line”, “the conscious part”, of the 
biosphere). This is not to be confused with Lamarck’s idea of the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics. The “freedom” that we have is 
perfectly DNA-endowed (and so the dogma of DNA-RNA-Protein 
“chain of life” is not sinned against). Freedom is mandated by our 
genes. Presumable choices affect evolution mainly through survival of 
the fittest and sexual selection. Whether some other epigenetic factors 
play a part in DNA mutation is still unclear. 
My beliefs, as presented here, have suggested a relationship 
between Cognition, Umwelt-Construction, Freedom, Responsiveness, 
Variation and Speciation. I have emphasized the continuity hypothesis 
of natural forms as resulting, pure and simple, from shared in-
heritance (which as far as we know involves DNA-based semiotic 
systems of communication and various corollary encoding/decoding-
processes), as cohabitants of the Earth’s biosphere. This inheritance, 
while phylogenetically seemingly causative, is not “fatalistic” or “deter-
ministic” on the ontogenetic, mental-behaviouristic level of the 
individual (the level of Innenwelt-Umwelt metabolism), because 
internal freedom, that is, mental responsiveness through choice-
making, is a crystallization and a localization of the biospheric 
principle of Adaptation in the cognitive “inside” of a central nervous 
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system. Freedom (cognition) is the way in which open-ended DNA 
processes become “interpreted”.  
Here is a summary of my views:  
 
Speciation is the Causative Result of Selective Processes of Phylogenetic 
Variation 
Mental “I-ness” (Internal Responsiveness) is the Ontogenetic Cognate to 
Phylogenetic Speciation 
Adaptation = “Stochastic” Phylogenetic Variation + “Free” Ontogenetic 
Cognition 
  
Being an animal implies “being-an-animal” and not just “being-an-
animal.” The animal (like the human being) is, in Sartre’s words, 
“condemned to be free” (for example, condemned to select its mates 
and meals). The animal is in this interstice between necessity and 
contingency; some species more than others. Some species probably 
have almost no “I-ness”, only enough to stop them from dying. But to 
have none is death. After all, the absence of internal responsiveness is 
the death of an organism. A very simple algebra can be developed: 
bigger brains, more “I-ness” (consciousness). 
We must admit that stating that I-ness and behaviour go hand in 
hand must involve some bit of circular argumentation. This would be 
a problem if we were trying to prove anything. Instead, we have to 
assume it before we can prove it, and it is very difficult to prove “world 
views” conclusively. But is it very easy, indeed, to try out different 
working assumptions, and see which fits best. Superfluity, parsimony, 
sufficiency and necessity are some of the criteria by which to judge the 
value of assumptions. It is my belief that assuming the “cognitive-
behavioural” continuity hypothesis is very parsimonious indeed and 
full of explanatory power. It is parsimonious because Darwinian 
Theory almost requires it. It dispenses with the superfluity of assuming 
a metaphysical “thinking substance” and a man-animal metaphysical 
gap (and other dualist dead-ends). It might well be sufficient, too, to 
explain the evolutionary history thus far. And it might be necessary, 
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for ethical as well as for epistemological reasons, as part of the present-
day “green” revolution.  
But what, exactly, is the role of cognition in evolutionary theory? 
The operation and functioning of the largely “hidden” (because 
invisible in the fossil record) laws of Darwinian natural selection (the 
mechanism whereby, say, a lizard becomes a bird as most palaeonto-
logists think has happened) is, after all, according to the accepted 
theory largely through random genetic mutation. This is of course true. 
But the role of sexual selection also plays a part, and so do ecological 
pressures. Most evolutionists, myself included, think that natural 
selection operates on the DNA-level as well as on the cognitive-beha-
vioural level. In fact, the “choices” of animals (whether comparable to 
human choices or not) in their responsiveness and adaptation to 
changing environmental, climatic and biospheric conditions are also 
agents of evolution. These choices — behavioural responses to stimuli 
(like me writing this essay or Pavlovian dog salivating) — are the 
mind’s cognitive contribution to natural selection. This is pretty much 
uncontroversial in science. See, for example, Robin Dunbar’s analysis 
of brain evolution: according to him, “completely hardwired behavior 
would be a recipe for evolutionary disaster: environmental conditions 
can undergo substantial change on a scale much shorter than an 
animal’s life span” (Dunbar 2001: 183). In other words, animal species 
should be able to adapt. The power to adapt is DNA-given; in this 
sense, freedom is programmed. Freedom means being free-to-behave.  
Behaviour, to the degree it is conscious, is somewhere between 
fully unpredictable and fully predictable: unpredictability (of the sort 
that is favourable to the survival of the species of the individual) is, by 
and large, the sign of higher intelligence or, at the very least, higher 
adaptive capacity. In information theory, unpredictability is the sign of 
novelty (of a high “information-over-noise” ratio). Humans and other 
primates are unusually (perhaps uniquely) unpredictable, which 
reflects their and our relatively higher cognitive capacities, but nature 
has provided Animalia with a grand continuum of adaptive strategies 
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for producing “unpredictability of behavioural-cognitive responsive-
ness” in the different branches of the evolutionary tree.  
After all, the development of nervous systems capable of self-
awareness and fast, malleable responsiveness (as it were, “responsibi-
lity”) is certainly a preferred adaptive strategy. 
Whomsoever has the “I” has the upper hand.  
So, it seems that the phylogenetic “Bauplan” favours the birth and 
flourishing of these highly complex, fast, “self-aware” (to the extent of 
their brain’s structural endowments) and self-protective sign pro-
cessing systems, which are physical-temporal manifestations of genetic 
material. We call these cognitive-behavioural systems animals. Cogni-
tive minds, to different degrees, have rapid response times (measured 
often in microseconds) whereas random mutation and weeding out of 
the unfit can be excruciatingly slow (measured often in hundreds of 
thousands, even millions of years). Cognition is the “speeding up” of 
unconscious natural variation and thus its apotheosis and highest 
form. Cognition is not an “on/off” thing, but the recognition of the 
“nowness” of the “cognitive-behavioural” me-situation in different 
“degrees” (remember Darwin 1871: 105) of self-awareness. I believe 
that by studying brains, nervous systems and the behaviour of animals, 
this “internal” I-ness becomes manifest, literally, before our eyes, 
without any magic tricks, hocus pocus or leaps of faith. By studying 
cognitive ethology, and by witnessing the cognitive-behavioural logos 
of the ethos in animals (including the human animal), we can work 
towards better understanding the kinds of minds that nature has 
developed. Thereby we’ll come to a better understanding of the self-
awakening of cognition (internal responsiveness) in the phylogenetic 
tree and we’ll be able to map the key points in the evolutionary tale of 
cognitive development. Responsiveness to stimuli is the key here, as 
the material side of cognition. So, ironically enough, it is radical 
behaviourism (radical empiricism), that old foe of cognitivism, which 
opens the doors of perception to cognition. 
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This flies in the face of all known dualism, and all epistemological 
dead-ends that we have had because we have assumed that world 
views have to be verifiable to be true. But things can only be proven if 
they are well defined. Having failed in the latter (to define the para-
meters of the problem), we can never succeed in the former (to prove 
that we have satisfied the relevant truth conditions of animal cogni-
tion). New “windows” are required. If we acquire new windows, the 
world remains the same; it does not care for our house renovation 
plans! At most, we will have a better vista into our own lives and into 
the outside world, providing us with the sort of immediate vision that 
enables us to read animal behaviour (and interpret the ethological 
data) for relevant signs of cognitive endowments and skills. The 
question, then, becomes a wholly empirical one. 
 
 
6. Behaviour as cognition; cognition as behaviour 
 
Can we provide a compatibilistic account of freedom and causality?  
I believe so. 
Freedom (from harm and predictability) is a biological imperative 
manifesting itself as stochastic responsiveness. Dunbar, for example, 
writes that “primates are so supremely flexible in their behavior that it 
is almost meaningless to try to define the ‘typical’ anything for a 
species” (Dunbar 2001: 176). In Christopher Hyatt’s wording, “WHAT 
we do is determined, HOW we do it is relative” (Hyatt 2004 [1982]: 
xxix). This means that the bio-evolutionary imperative (the DNA-
biomass mechanism of encoding cognitively responsive structure and 
form) works side-by-side with purely random, stochastic variation on 
the level of the gene pool. Variation, for Darwin, was the first stage of 
speciation. Species (reproducing life forms) arise out of the sea of 
Varieties (unsustainable life forms). Likewise, genotypically, Action 
(behaviour) arises out of the sea of Choices (cognitive possibilities). It 
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seems that life is twice a “gamble”: mutation and liberty are its winning 
cards. 
In the words of Bekoff (1995) quoted earlier in the essay: “While 
general rules of thumb may be laid down genetically during evolution, 
specific rules of conduct that account for all possible contingencies are 
too numerous to be hard-wired (Griffin 1984)”. In other words, 
“completely hardwired behavior would be a recipe for evolutionary 
disaster” (Dunbar 2001: 183). Genetics is the premise, not the answer. 
To solely rely on genetic-behavioural models of analysis has been a 
failure because the limited code of the DNA is simply a part of the 
constructive process of an organism, which relies on selective adap-
tation for its survival. Such adaptation always involves responsiveness 
to the environment, and this responsiveness can sometimes utilize 
conditioned (whether through evolution or through individual ex-
perience) automated reflexes as reliable safety mechanisms, but even 
such cognitive responsiveness is “free” to the degree that it has 
“chosen to be conditioned” (in some silly sense) to operate through a 
specific Innenwelt-Umwelt feedback loop. Freedom is always freedom 
to form such signifying loops. Freedom is behavioural patterning.  
The answer to the question, already studied by some bio- and zoo-
semioticians, of how is DNA-RNA-protein semiotic process possible in 
the first place, seems to imply a process of active interpretation, 
adaptation and variation on the very cellular level itself. Therein re-
search is due. Elsewhere, the adaptive-selective mechanisms of DNA-
biomass speciation (that is, variation) on the scale of nervous systems 
in “higher” animals like mammals, birds and reptilians seem to imply 
a deep consistency of cognitive endowment. In animals, the genetics of 
the DNA have pre-programmed the presence of cognitive possibilities 
(“mental choices”) as a bio-evolutionary imperative.  
Now, the problem of the emergence of the “mind as we know it” 
(the mammalian, primate mind) still remains an issue. Here, the role 
of sexuality, reproduction and coupling in this story is an interesting 
one, especially since the aesthetic and volitional sensibilities of many 
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animals are heightened during periods of heat, mating and pair 
bonding. At any rate, the various cognitive pathways to action, the 
various mental processes (that is, various Innenwelt-Umwelt cycles of 
interchange of signs) and the various physical responses found in the 
animal kingdom, from rats to humans, have been well documented in 
the relevant ethological literature. The community interpretation has 
simply been strongly biased against any perceived human-animal 
“fraternizing”. But empirical evidence has already proven the quali-
tative question (of animal cognition); what it can do is update the 
quantitative reservoir of knowledge (about kinds of animal cognition), 
and about our own special evolutionary history. 
The overturning of “anthropologocentrism” (man-language-
centrism) should result in the wider acceptance of the principle of 
kingdom-universal freedom (variation), of which a special case is 
species-specific freedom (mental processing). The field of cognitive 
studies suffers tremendously from being relegated to being a part of 
anthropology. By subjecting all life forms to a cognitive-behavioural 
analysis of minds-in-action, we may elucidate what folk psychology calls 
“mental liberty” and what Uexküll termed Innenwelt’s capacity for 
active world-construction. What we should be looking for in ob-
servation are signs of active-constructive-interpretative “free responsive-
ness” (the presence of “unpredictability”) in animal behaviour. Thus far, 
the observations and theories of scholars in the tradition of Charles 
Darwin (whose work should be seen as conducive rather than 
antagonistic to biological cognitivism), Jakob and Thure von Uexküll, 
Karl von Frisch, Marc Bekoff, Jane Goodall, Dario Martinelli, Jesper 
Hoffmeyer and Kalevi Kull seem already to point in the direction that it 
is indeed rather more “economical or parsimonious” (Bekoff 1995) to 
presuppose the presence of zoo-cognitivism, Innenwelt-action/activity, 
free will and “intentional” sign-processing, that is, bio-metabolistic se-
miosis, in animals and probably across all levels of biosphere (although 
this universal dimension lies beyond the present study). There is a 
gradation from lower order animals to higher order animals. Minds 
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come in different “shapes and sizes”. Things like cognition, intuition 
and free will are always, to be sure, limited — but then all free will is 
limited, including human free will. Or prove me wrong: please “decide” 
to stop breathing now, for ten minutes... Well? I rest my case. 
The next step is to embrace this emerging empirical reality and to 
realize that to hold fast to old preconceptions, let alone to debate them 
with all seriousness, is to give erroneous and outdated philosophy 
undeserved publicity. The principle of biospherical continuity, implicit 
in the concept of the Umwelt and actually already in Darwin’s idea of 
Species (defined as naturally selected variation), if accepted, would 
facilitate both academic understanding and fieldwork observatory 
accuracy of ethological data. It might also possibly give rise to im-
proved understanding (because rooted in evolutionary data) of human 
cognitive skills, as well as answer, or at least reformulate, the philo-
sophical issue of freedom and choice-making, now definable as a biotic 
imperative for variation (in genotype) and cognition (in phenotype), 
rooted in the DNA encoding/decoding sign processes of structuration, 
individuation and speciation. 
 
 
7. Conclusion: Life in the human zoo...  
and breaking out of the cage 
 
To use Fentress’ metaphor, each way of categorizing behaviour is a 
window on the behaviour of the other, and from each window there is a 
different view... (Bekoff, Jamieson 1990: 3; my italics). 
 
We must continue, over the years, to observe, record and interpret. We 
have already learnt much. Gradually, as more people work together and 
pool their information we are raising the blind of the window through 
which, one day, we shall be able to see even more clearly into the mind of 
the chimpanzee... (Goodall 1990: 11; my italics) 
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These metaphors of Goodall and Fentress should make us think of all 
the windows we are opening and closing on a daily basis. Let us 
summarize our position up until now. We have proposed the unity of 
behaviorism and cognitivism. This implies minding animals (see 
Bekoff 2002) as much as animalizing minds. The theory of zoo-cogni-
tivism (a word that should not be confused with the anthropo-centric 
practice of looking for “human-like” traits in animals) implies the 
presence, in each species, of some Umwelt specific inner world. We 
humans, as language-users, utilize our freedom to operate in our 
modelling system (spoken and written language, semiotic coding, 
etc...), oftentimes, to enhance, magnify, explain and justify our own 
advantageous position in relation to those outside our system — that 
is, the barbaric, illiterate, un-semiotic, irrational, illogical, non-psychic, 
non-egoic and unfree (non-cognitive) Other. Selfishness, you see, is 
one of the ingrained properties of not only individuals but gene pools 
(cf. Dawkins’s metaphor of “The Selfish Gene”) and even our 
modelling systems. Selfishness implies love of the in-group but also 
lack of love for the out-group. Human semiotic systems (such as our 
spoken language), as human modelling systems, are designed for the 
evolutionary purpose of self-justification. Language aims to establish a 
contented (pacified and civilized) and normalized (individuated and 
associated) in-group. In ethological study, the “descriptive bias” forces 
a naturally dissymmetrical relationship between the Scientist and the 
Animal. This rift has been unduly magnified by the prevalent 
popularity of the partially overlapping Judeo-Christian and Cartesian 
traditions. 
Even in the absence of great metaphysical theories, old assump-
tions die hard. We are, after all, social animals, destined to speak 
among ourselves, with suspicion, about strangers and foreigners. Any 
rumours of our own “exogenous” ancestry are treated with ridicule 
and shock. 
Human are, in Desmond Morris’s words, naked apes. This does not, 
however, mean that we are “conditioned” in our biological deter-
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minism — let alone that we should follow some imaginary “biological 
morality” (Morris 1967: 87) — but that we, like all animals, are DNA-
tailored to respond cognitively (of which human-level consciousness is 
a particularly complex form) to ranging stimuli. If cognition can be 
quantized (as I believe it can, relating to “levels of consciousness” 
correlating to the emerging complexity of central nervous systems and 
brain structures in animals, primates and humans), then humans are 
perhaps more free and more cognizant (and I shall emphasize, 
perhaps) than any other animal on the planet. But quantity is the key 
here: the development of the animal mind, up the mammalian, 
primate and hominid branches, all the way to Homo I-Podiensis (or, if 
you insist, Homo Sapiens), is a fuzzy and uncertain mountain climb, a 
long-winded uphill battle up (what Richard Dawkins has called) “the 
Mount Improbable” — up the evolutionary tree of emerging struc-
tures of cognitive capacity.  
Without the interplay of (stochastic) phylogenetic variation and 
(free) ontogenetic cognition, evolution would stop. Evolution implies a 
wide variety of cognition; cognition in fauna is not (always or 
necessarily) “human mind”-like. It is Umwelt-specific. This might beg 
the question: why use the term “mind” at all for so many different 
kinds of biological solutions? I think it simply happens to be the best 
word available, most universally applicable, and I do mean it to be 
taken literally. Animals really have minds. This can be explained evo-
lutionarily, as the result of adaptive pressures. Freedom is the means 
whereby the selfish gene reproduces itself. The plurality of reproduc-
tively advantageous variations on the level of evolution, pinpointed by 
Darwin, is correlated on the level of individual minds as the plurality 
of behavioural patterns (“ethological data”) and modelling systems 
(“languages”) caused by the free internal operability of signs (the 
“freedom of choice”). 
Animals live, breathe and think. Q.E.D. 
It certainly seems that way. And that, for many of us, is reasonable 
and sufficient grounds for behaving in accordance with that pragmatic 
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realization, despite the best exercises in “paper doubt” (as Peirce 
snubbed the practice) by skeptical philosophers. After all, are we to 
study life from the dead angle of self-congratulatory “arm chair” men-
tal gymnastics or rather from the perspective of our natural intuition 
and scientific understanding? 
For the future, let us hope that cognition becomes a thing like any 
other, subject to behavioural and empirical verification, without the 
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Изучая когнитивность животных:  
эпистемология, этология и этика 
 
Вопрос о когнитивных способностях животных является объектом 
ожесточенных споров в научном мире на протяжении двух послед-
них десятилетий (напр. в рамках когнитивной этологии и бихевио-
ризма) и, на самом деле, в течение всей длинной истории натурфило-
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софии (начиная от Платона и Аристотеля и — через Декарта — 
вплоть до Дарвина). На пути научных разысканий эмпирического и 
эволюционного объяснения возникновения и развития познаватель-
ной способности/когнитивных способностей встречалось множество 
философских споров, тупиков и эпистемологической растерянности. 
Я утверждаю, что тут мы имеем дело не только с противостоящими 
друг другу парадигмами эмпирических расследований, но и с кон-
фликтующими философскими мировоззрениями. После рассмотре-
ния нескольких наиболее часто встречающихся идейных конфликтов 
на основе примеров из исследований животных я заявляю (в строго 
дарвинистском духе), что когнитивные способности в природе ха-
рактеризуются непрерыными и плавными переходами, которые 
возникают в ходе естественного отбора  вариативных форм. Правда 
о поведении и когнитивных способностях животных находится где-
то посередине между двумя мифами — мифа о «свободном» человеке 
и мифа о животных с «запрограммированием поведеним». В конце я 
надеюсь немного разъяснить те глубокие философские проблемы (и 
многие псевдопроблемы), которые заводят в тупик и дезориенти-
руют как обычных людей, так и философов и ученых в их стрем-
лении к знанию о природе.       
 
 
Loomade kognitiivsust uurides:  
epistemoloogia, etoloogia ja eetika 
 
Küsimus loomade kognitiivsetest võimetest on olnud teadusilmas vihase 
vaidluse objektiks paar viimast aastakümmet (näiteks kognitiivse etoloo-
gia ja biheiviorismi raames) ja õigupoolest kogu loodusfilosoofia pika aja-
loo vältel (Platonist ja Aristotelesest Descartes’i kaudu Darwinini välja). 
Tunnetuse tekke ja arengu empiirilise ning evolutsioonilise seletuse tea-
duslike otsingute teel on ette tulnud rohkesti filosoofilisi vastuväiteid, 
tupikteid ja epistemoloogilist nõutust. Väidan, et tegemist on mitte ainult 
vastandlike empiiriliste uuringute paradigmadega, vaid ka vastandlike 
filosoofiliste maailmavaadetega. Peale sageliesinevamate ideekonfliktide 
käsitlemist mõningate vastavateemalistest loomauuringutest pärinevate 
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näidete põhjal, pakun rangelt darwinistlikus vaimus välja, et kognitiivseid 
võimeid iseloomustab looduses teatud pidevus ja sujuv üleminek, mis 
tavatseb tekkida kohastunud teisendvormide loodusliku valiku käigus. 
Tõde loomade käitumisest ja tunnetusest asub kusagil kahe müüdi — 
müüdi “vabast” inimesest ja “etteprogrammeeritud käitumisega” loomade 
müüdi — vahepeal. Lõpetuseks loodan tuua mõningat leevendust neile 
sügavatele filosoofilistele probleemidele (ja paljudele pseudoprobleemi-
dele), mis painavad ja hämmastavad nii tavainimesi, teadlasi kui filosoofe 
nende püüdlustes teadmiste poole looduse kohta. 
 
 
